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ABSTRACT
Data representation plays a critical role in the performance of novelty detection methods from machine
learning (ML). Network traffic has conventionally posed many challenges to conventional anomaly
detection, due to the inherent diversity of network traffic. Even within a single network, the most
fundamental characteristics can change; this variability is fundamental to network traffic but especially
true in the Internet of Things (IoT), where the network hosts a wide array of devices, each of which
behaves differently, exhibiting high variance in both operational modalities and network activity
patterns. Although there are established ways to study the effects of data representation in supervised
learning, the problem is particularly challenging and understudied in the unsupervised learning
context, where there is no standard way to evaluate the effect of selected features and representations
at training time. This work explores different data representations for novelty detection in the Internet
of Things, studying the effect of different representations of network traffic flows on the performance
of a wide range of machine learning algorithms for novelty detection for problems arising in IoT,
including malware detection, the detection of rogue devices, and the detection of cyberphysical
anomalies. We find that no single representation works best (in terms of area under the curve)
across devices or ML methods, yet the following features consistently improve the performance of
novelty detection algorithms: (1) traffic sizes, (i.e., packet sizes rather than number of packets in
volume-based representations); and (2) packet header fields (i.e., TTL, TCP flags).
Keywords Outlier detection · Gaussian mixture model (GMM) · One-class support vector machine (OCSVM) · Kernel
density estimation (KDE) · Autoencoder (AE)
1 Introduction
An increasing number of interconnected “Internet-of-Things” (IoT) are being deployed to monitor and manage homes,
buildings, infrastructure, and even outdoor spaces. An intention of many such deployments is to monitor the environment
for new, unusual, or anomalous activities—in other words, patterns that have previously not been observed. Such new
or unusual activities can be indicative of many types of noteworthy events, including network or physical security
incidents, device or infrastructure malfunctions, even behavioral changes in the users of the devices that might be
indicative of abnormal human conditions or behaviors. The general goal of detecting such new, unseen events falls
under the general category of novelty detection problems in machine learning, for which there are a wide variety of
possible procedures, including Gaussian mixture models (GMM), one-class support vector machines (OCSVM), kernel
density estimation (KDE), and others. The success of any of these procedures—and, in fact, for any machine learning
approach—depends fundamentally on how the data are represented as input features to the model. Often the choice of
features and how they are represented are more fundamental to the effectiveness of the approach than the model itself.
IoT devices provide useful “digital exhaust” that can be used to detect a broad class of new, unseen events and anomalies.
Specifically, Internet-connected devices must necessarily generate network traffic as they communicate with other
devices on the network (e.g., other devices on the home network, cloud-hosted services that control these devices).
Unusual activities or incidents may be reflected in changes to the underlying traffic itself. As a simple example,
an Internet-connected light switch generates associated traffic when it is turned on and off, effectively generating
a timeseries of network traffic over time. The data itself is timestamped, and multi-dimensional—for example, the
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device may talk to more than one destination on the network; the timestamped nature of the dataset makes the data
itself irregularly sampled in the time domain. Intuitively, one could assume that the things that a human (or computer
program) does to interact with such a device might follow some normal patterns, and that novelty detection might be
interested in identifying deviations in these patterns, where those deviations might reflect anything from a malware
infection to someone entering the room at an unusual or unexpected time. As Internet-connected devices become
increasingly ubiquitous, the digital exhaust that these devices produce provides a wealth of signal for detecting a wide
variety of anomalies for just about any activity in our daily lives. Approaches to capture novelty in the traffic that these
devices generate are less well explored.
Unfortunately, representations of network traffic that are most effective for novelty detection remain a priori unclear.
By default, representation choices involve various statistics on traffic volumes, decisions on packet sampling rates,
and choices of observation intervals; however, which of these choices retain predictive information remains a priori
unclear, especially given the large variety of IoT devices with vastly different traffic patterns. For instance, if we decide
to record and build on number of packets per second, then changes in traffic patterns at the micro-second level might go
undetected; on the other hand, recording at the microsecond level would result in higher dimensional observations that
machine learning procedures might fail to scale up to, due to well-known challenges with high dimensional data1.
Our goal is to explore how different data representations for network traffic affect novelty detection rates, across a range
of IoT devices, types of novelty, and unsupervised machine learning models. Given raw traffic inputs, we focus on the
problem of identifying novel network flows—sequences of packets from a fixed source to a fixed destination, a common,
intuitive unit of identification in network traffic that, at a high-level, represents a single exchange of data between two
network endpoints. From a practical perspective, the ability to identify a novel flow of course lends itself to detecting
other types of novelty; for example, a device that generates novel traffic flows may itself be considered novel. There are
many possible ways to represent raw traffic traces (i.e., packets) as inputs. The data itself can be aggregated on various
time windows, elided, transformed into different bases, sampled, and so forth.
Results and contributions. We compare flow-based data representations as combined with various machine learning
procedures for novelty detection. To compare the performance of different machine learning procedures, we report the
area under the ROC curve (AUC) for each approach and each dataset. Because machine learning procedures are very
sensitive to hyperparameter choices (e.g., bandwidth choice in OCSVMs, or the number of dimensions in PCA), we
consider both the best possible choices of such hyperparameters, which unfortunately are hard to find in practice without
labeled data, and default choices that might be made in practice based on rule-of-thumbs. To ensure an apples-to-apples
comparison across procedures, we ensure that all data representations result in feature vectors of a similar order in
dimension, in the range of 10 to 30 dimensions. Our primary results are as follows:
• No single data representation works best across all devices and models.
• Performing a Fourier transform on the raw network packet traces generally has minimal effect on model
accuracy, regardless of the representation of the data in the time domain.
• Incorporating packet size and TCP transport header information (e.g., IP TTL, TCP flags) into the timeseries
can significantly improve the accuracy of novelty detection, across a variety of models and outlier detection
techniques.
Outline Section 2 outlines the common ways of representing network traffic flows in the literature. It is difficult
to be completely exhaustive, yet we focus on the most established approaches for representing traffic data both in
general network anomaly detection and in the growing literature on novelty detection for IoT, comparing tuning and
configuration and tuning decisions that might be made in practice. Section 3 outlines the machine learning models
and performance metrics that we use for our comparative analysis, as well as the metrics that we use to evaluate these
models. Section 4 describes the setup of our experiments, including how we selected hyperparameters for various
novelty detection models, as well as the datasets that we used in our evaluation and how we processed those datasets.
Section 5 describes the results from our experiments, and Section 6 concludes with a summary and directions for future
work.
2 Data Representation
The importance of data representation has in fact fostered many subfields such as metric learning, representation
learning which aim to automatically find the right representation to be coupled with given procedures, so far with
1The so-called curse of dimensionality in machine learning is the observed fact that the higher the dimension of the input, the
harder it is to achieve good accuracy; in particular, we might then require an amount of training data exponential as a function of
dimension.
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mixed results, but with much success in application areas such as computer vision and speech processing []. No such
automatic approach has yet been developed in the fledgling application area of novelty detection for IoT, and a main
aim of this work is to bring attention to the importance of data representation, and identify representations that work
well in general while meeting practical needs for succinct representations.
Machine learning procedures require for the most part, feature vectors of the same dimension, i.e., every flow has to be
represented as a vector of a fixed number of carefully chosen features – i.e., information extracted from the flow.
We consider various feature-representations of forward flows, where a forward flow aggregates all packets, with a same
five-tuple identifier, sent from a device being monitored to another device or server. The five-tuple identifier consists
of source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination port, and protocol. The basic representations
considered are as follows.
• STATS: a set of statistical quantities compiled from a flow. In particular, we choose 10 of the most common
such statistics in the literature (see e.g., [16]), namely, flow duration, number of packets sent per second,
number of bytes per second, and the following statistics on packet sizes (in bytes) in a flow: mean, standard
deviation, the first to third quantiles, the minimum, and maximum.
• SIZES: a flow is represented as a time series of packet sizes in bytes.
• IAT: a flow is represented as a time series of inter-arrival times between packets, i.e., elapsed time in seconds
between any two packets in the flow.
• SAMP-NUM: a flow is partitioned into small time intervals of equal length δt, and the number of packets in
each interval is recorded; thus a flow is represented as a time series of packet counts in small time intervals.
Here, δt might be viewed as a choice of sampling rate for the time series, hence the nomenclature.
• SAMP-SIZE: a flow is partitioned into small time intervals of equal length δt, and the total packet size (i.e.,
byte count) in each interval is recorded; thus, a flow is represented as a time series of byte counts in small time
intervals.
Remark that any of the above time series representations (i.e., all but STATS) might be given in time domain (which
we choose by default) or in Fourier domain, in which case we append FFT to the representation name, i.e., IAT-FFT,
SAMP-NUM-FFT, and SAMP-SIZE-FFT.
When using ML procedures for novelty detection, we have to ensure that all of the above representations result in
feature-vectors of the same dimension for any given device being monitored. This is automatically the case for STATS,
but not for the other representations, in light of variations in flow durations and lengths (number of packets) for a given
device. To ensure that each sample has the same dimension, we select a fixed time duration for all flows corresponding
to the 90th percentile of all flow lengths or durations for a device. We use this duration so as to capture the typical
behavior of most device instances of a particular type. Any definition of typicality may be appropriate here, depending
on the desired compactness and complexity of the corresponding representation. Using the 90th percentile of all flow
durations results in a comparable number of dimensions (typically 10–30) for most of the devices that we consider in
this study. Details on achieving fixed feature dimensions are given in Section 4 on experimental setup.
3 Machine Learning Models and Performance Metrics
We describe the novelty detection procedures that we evaluate in our study, as well as the performance metrics that we
use to compare each of these procedures.
3.1 Novelty Detection Procedures
We consider popular novelty detection procedures from Machine Learning and Statistics, approaches based on Isolation
Forests (IF), One-Class Support Vector Machines (OCSVM), Kernel Density Estimation (KDE), Gaussian Mixture
Models (GMM), Principal Component Analysis (PCA), and Auto Encoders (AE). Important common aspects of all
such detection procedures are as follows:
1. Data representation as features. Detection procedures invariably require data—here network flows—
represented as a vector X ∈ Rd of d predictive features. While many procedures operate directly on
that feature representation (e.g., IF, KDE, GMM), others (e.g., OCSVM, PCA, AE) remap vectors X into
refined representations where certain patterns—clusters of similar network activities—might be more evident.
2. Training and testing phase. Detection procedures are trained in a first phase using n training datapoints
{Xi}ni=1 – i.e., n copies Xi of typical values of normal features X (e.g., each Xi representing a normal traffic
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Table 1: Data representations that are commonly used for anomaly detection.
Reference Flow
duration
IAT SIZES FFT of IAT
and SIZES
SAMP-
NUM
SAMP-
SIZES
Network Intrusion Detection
Lakshari et al. [10] 3 3 3 7 7 7
Mukar et al. [9] 7 3 7 7 7 7
Mirsky et al. [15] 7 7 7 7 3 3
IoT Anomaly Detection
Al Jawarneh et al. [2] 3 7 3 7 7 7
Doshi et al. [5] 7 3 3 7 7 7
Meidan et al. [14] 7 3 7 7 3 3
Bhatia et al. [3] 7 7 3 7 3 7
Thamilarasu et al. [22] 7 7 3 7 7 7
DDoS Detection
Fouladi et al. [6] 7 7 7 3 7 7
Lima et al. [12] 7 7 3 7 7 7
flow), from which they produce a scoring function S(X); high scores S(X) are expected to be typical of
normal observations such as the training datapoints Xi, while low-scores would be indicative of the query X
being an outlier (novelty). Subsequently, in the so-called testing phase (or deployment phase), a threshold t
might be chosen so that any query X is flagged as novelty whenever S(X) < t.
Note that, in practical use cases, the right choice of threshold can be difficult since the available training data is
assumed to be all normal making it hard to assess false negative rates. Instead, one might choose a threshold
based on the false positive rates the application can tolerate, which can be estimated for each choice of t based
on the normal data (i.e., data known to not have positive label). Related issues are discussed in Section 3.2 on
performance metrics.
Normality scores in ML. In KDE or GMM, the training data is used to estimate the density function f of the data in
Rd (that is their spatial distribution), where by definition f(x) is low in those regions of space that have little data. This
density would then serve as a scoring function S(X) .= f(X). IF works similarly by first partitioning the space Rd into
ensembles of high and low density regions, and flagging any query X as a novelty if it lies in a low density region.
On the other hand, PCA and AE work by identifying a lower-dimensional space X embedded in the representation
space Rd on which most of the training datapoints Xi appear to lie. In PCA X is a linear space, while in AE it can be
highly nonlinear (using nonlinear activation functions in a neural network). The score S(X) then denotes how close X
is to X with lowest scores for points farthest from X .
OCSVM stands farther apart as it proceeds by first remapping all Xi’s – through a transformation Φ(Xi) into a higher
dimensional feature spaceH (possibly of infinite dimension) and then essentially identifying regions of high density
in H. The underlying assumption is that patterns might be more visible in H, for instance, all Φ(Xi) might cluster
together into a normal region (either a half space inH or an enclosing ball; the score S(X) is then lower for queries X
that map as Φ(X) outside the normal region ofH.
3.2 Performance Metric
Area Under the Curve (AUC). As explained above, detection procedures flag new queries X as novel if it scores
below a certain threshold t (i.e., if S(X) < t). Now notice a tension: the higher the threshold t, the more likely it is that
all novel X are correctly detected, but unfortunately, the more likely it is also that normal datapoints are flagged as novel
(a false alarm). Thus, the best performing approaches—combination of data representation and choice of detection
procedure—are those that alleviate this tension, performing accurate detection while minimizing false positives.
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Such tradeoffs are well captured by a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, which plots the detection rate
against the false alarm rate as t is varied from small to large; a large area under the curve (AUC) indicates that
good tradeoffs are possible under the given detection approach. We therefore adopt AUC as a sensible measure of
performance.
Sensitivity to Hyperparameters. All detection procedures come with hyperparameters, i.e., configuration choices
that can greatly affect performance. Important hyperparameters are e.g., bandwidth in KDE or OSCVM, number of
partitions in IF, number of components in GMM, embedding dimension in PCA and AE. We therefore have to carefully
pick such parameters in practice, although the right approach remains unclear, especially in unsupervised learning
problems such as novelty detection where we typically do not have a labeled validation set to evaluate choices.
Since hyperparameter tuning in unsupervised learning remains the subject of ongoing research in Machine Learning
and Statistics, we decided to present results for the best choices of parameters, picked a posteriori as those choices that
result in the best performance on a test set, as described in Section 4.1 below.
More configuration details such as range or parameters are given in Section 4.1. Other configuration choices based on
common rule-of-thumbs are covered in the appendix along with relevant results.
4 Experiment Setup
We first describe the process by which we choose hyperparameters for each of the novelty detection procedures that we
evaluate in this study. We then describe the datasets we use to evaluate each novelty detection method, including how
we process each of these datasets and select parameters for each corresponding feature representation.
4.1 Hyperparameter Choices for Novelty Detection Procedures
All detection procedures are implemented in the scikit-learn Python package. We now describe configuration choices,
both for the best hyperparameter choice (OPT) – picked a posteriori using test data as described in Section 3.2 above –
and a rule-of-thumbs choice (Default). The results in the main paper are presented for the OPT choice, while results for
Default are presented in the appendix.
• OCSVM [20] (implemented by [24]). We choose a Gaussian kernel of the form K(x, x′) ∝ exp(−‖x −
x′‖2/2σ2), and pick σ as follows. We consider the quantiles [0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9] ∪ {0.95} on increasing
distances between pairs of points in the training sample.
OPT: The parameter σ is then picked as that quantile which yields the best AUC.
Default: σ is picked as the 0.3 quantile of inter-point distances.
• KDE [11, 21]. We use a Gaussian kernel, of the same form as OCSVM above, and pick the bandwidth σ
exactly the same way for both OPT and Default.
• GMM [4]. We choose the number of Gaussian components k on a range [2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 30].
OPT: k is chosen as the value in the range maximizing AUC.
Default: k is obtained as the number of high-density regions (or modes) in the training data, as obtained by
the quickshift++ procedure of [8].
• IF [13] (implemented by [24]). We pick the number k of trees in the range 30 to 300 with increments of 10.
OPT: k is chosen as the value in the range maximizing AUC.
Default: k is 100, which is the same as the default value in pyod.
• PCA [1] For X ∈ Rd, i.e., having d features, we pick the projection dimension dim in a range. We pick dim in
a range {d1 + i · (d− 2)/9e}9i=0 of (up to 10) values (approximately evenly spaced) between 1 and d− 1.
OPT: dim is chosen as the value in the range maximizing AUC.
Default: dim is estimated by maximum likelihood (MLE) in scikit-learn.
• AE [25] (from PyTorch [18] using LeakyRelu for activation functions). For X ∈ Rd, we use the following
architecture with 5 layers, determined by a tuning parameter dim: one input layer of size d (number of neurons),
followed by a hidden layer of size h-dim .= min{(d− 1), d2 · dime}, a latent layer of size dim, a subsequent
hidden layer of size h-dim, and finally an output layer of size d. We pick dim in a range {d1+i ·(d−2)/9e}9i=0
of (up to 10) values (approximately evenly spaced) between 1 and d− 1.
OPT: dim is chosen as the value in the range maximizing AUC.
Default: dim is dd/2e.
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Table 2: Datasets.
Reference Description Devices Type of Novelty
UNB
IDS [17]
Normal and DDoS attack traces from per-
sonal computers (PC), which are chosen
from Monday trace and Friday trace.
Five PCs (noted as PC1,
PC2, PC3, PC4, and PC5,
respectively)
DDoS attack
CTU
IoT [23]
Bitcoin-Mining and Botnet traffic traces
generated by two Raspberries; we aim to
distinguish the two devices by their attack
traces (i.e., Mirai and CoinMiner); hence
we use one generated Mirai as normal, the
other generated CoinMiner as novel.
Two Raspberries Novel (infected) device
MAWI [7]
Normal traffic generated by two PCs,
which are collected on Dec. 07, 2019;
we use one PC (whose IP address is
202.171.168.50) as normal, the other
(whose IP address is 202.4.27.109) as
novel.
Two PCs Novel (normal) device
IoT
Lab
Data traces are generated by IoT devices
(e.g., fridge) in a private lab environment.
We choose two kinds of normal traffic
generated by a smart TV and a PC.
A smart TV and a PC
(noted as TV&PC) Novel device
Four smart-home devices, each with two
types of traffic traces labeled as normal
when there is no human interaction, and
novel when being operated by a human.
Google home (GHom),
Samsung camera
(SCam), Samsung
fridge (SFrig), and Bose
soundtouch (BSTch)
Novel activity
4.2 Data
We consider a combination of publicly available traffic traces and traces collected on private consumer IoT devices. We
aim to evaluate representative set of devices, from multi-purpose devices such as laptop PCs, and Google Home, to
less complex electronics and appliances such as smart cameras and TVs. Furthermore we aim at a a representative set
of novelty, from benign novelties (new activity, or a new device type), to novelties due to malicious activities (DDoS
attack). Table 2 describes these datasets, and types of novelty being detected.
Obtaining flows. We parse upstream flows from datasets in Table 2 using Scapy [19]. Given that certain devices
can have arbitrarily long flows, we truncate each flow from a given dataset to have duration at most that of the 90th
upper-percentile of flow durations in the dataset. Henceforth, a flow refers to these choices of flows involving truncation.
Selecting feature representation dimension. Each flow is then represented using any of the feature-representation
choices described in Section 2. Here, we have to ensure that, given a representation choice, e.g., IAT, all flows result in
vectors of the same dimension d for each dataset. We apply a similar approach to enforce such fixed dimension d, as
outlined below. For a fixed dataset, let d0 denote the 90th upper-percentile of number of packets per flow.
• STATS: automatically results in vectors of the same dimension d, equal to the number of statistics (on packet
size) computed on a flow.
• IAT, or SIZE: dimension is fixed to d = d0 − 1 for IAT, and d = d0 for size; namely, for long flows, we
truncate the number of packets in a flow to the first d0; for short flows where the number of packets is less than
d0, we append 0’s to the IAT representation to arrive at d features.
• IAT + SIZE: just concatenates IAT and SIZE representations to dimension d = 2d0 − 1.
• SAMP-NUM or SAMP-SIZE: dimension is fixed to d = d0 − 1 as in the case of IAT. Now we pick a fixed
window size δt, and each flow is divided into up to d windows of length δt; for flows of short duration, where
δt is large w.r.t. duration, we simply append 0’s.
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Choice of δt: we start with candidate choices ∆ .= {tf/d}, over durations tf of flows f in a given
dataset. We then consider 10 choices of δt in ∆, each choice an i-th quantile of values in ∆, for each
i ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 95}. Thus, each such choice of δt yields one (SAMP-NUM or SAMP-
SIZE) representation for all flows; since we do not know which such representation (i.e. choice of δt) is best a
priori2 we report the best AUC resulting out of all 10 choices of δt.
Each of the above representations, besides STATS, can then be viewed as fixed length time series, and therefore admit a
Fourier domain representation; the corresponding Fourier representation is then set to the same dimension d, i.e., we
retain as many Fourier components as the original time series.
The resulting representation dimensions for each dataset are reported in Table 4 in the appendix.
5 Results
In this section, we explore how data representation affects the performance of different novelty detection algorithms.
We are interested in the difference in AUC due to the presence or absence of particular feature types with respect
to a set of basic feature representations, namely STATS, SIZE, IAT, SUMP-NUM, and SAMP-SIZE (Table 3 also
includes IAT+SIZE as a baseline for future comparisons). We will see that across ML procedures, (1) Fourier domain
representations have little advantage over raw time series (despite being generally thought of as a better way to capture
important trends in timeseries), while the effect of (2) packet size information, and (3) packet header information tend
to be significant overall. We focus on some of the most popular ML approaches (OCSVM, IF, AE, KDE) in the main
text, under OPT tuning, while results for omitted ML approaches, for Default tuning, and omitted datasets are given in
the appendix. We substantiate messages (1), (2), and (3) in subsections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. Table 3 gives baselines for
comparisons.
Statistical significance. Throughout this section, we often display error bars of length 1/
√
n (n denoting test sample
sizes as given in Table 5), which is a ballpark for standard deviation in AUC computed on a test sample of size n.
We first explore the effect of Fourier domain representations; then we explore how including packet sizes and fields
from the packet header ultimately affect the performance of different novelty detection approaches.
5.1 Effect of Fourier Domain Representation
We compare Fourier domain representations—obtained by Fast Fourier Transforms (FFT), where we retain as many
FFT components as the number of time points—to raw time-domain representations of each flow IAT, SAMP-NUM,
SAMP-SIZE. Figure 1 presents the difference in AUC, i.e., the AUC obtained under FFT minus that obtained under the
corresponding raw time series representation.
The same trend is observed across ML procedures: apart for a few device datasets (e.g., positive effect in SFrig and
negative effect in BSTch w.r.t. IAT), FFT makes no significant difference in the achieved AUC over raw time series. In
other words, the various ML procedures seem able to extract much of the same information already from the raw time
series, i.e., their internal representations of the data already account for major trends in the times series and thus do
away with the need to preprocess through FFT.
Henceforth, we focus attention on raw representations for time series in subsequent discussions.
5.2 Effect of Packet Size Information
Referring back to Table 3, packet size information immediately appears to be important based on the generally higher
AUCs achieved under STATS (which primarily compiles statistics on packet sizes in a flow) to those achieved under
basic representations such as IAT and SAMP-NUM (devoid of packet size information). Interestingly, SIZE, a time
series of packet sizes in a flow, does not perform as well as STATS does over IAT, and SAMP-NUM.
As it turns out, adding packet size information to IAT or SAMP-NUM representations improves on such representations
alone. Namely, in the case of IAT, size information is added in by concatenating IAT and SIZE vectors, which we denote
IAT+SIZE. For SAMP-NUM, a time-series of number of packets in small fixed time intervals δt, size information is
accounted for by instead compiling total packet size in fixed time intervals δt.
2In fact we do not know how such choice might be automated in practice, as automating sampling rates remains an largely open
research problem.
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Table 3: AUCs for 4 ML approaches on basic feature representations.
Detector Dataset STATS SIZE IAT SIZE
IAT+
NUM
SAMP-
SIZE
SAMP-
OCSVM
UNB(PC1) 0.56 0.70 0.78 0.92 0.74 0.76
UNB(PC4) 0.48 0.66 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.79
CTU 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.88 0.88
MAWI 0.88 0.71 0.58 0.43 0.60 0.61
TV&PC 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.93
SFrig 0.98 0.93 0.81 0.85 0.96 0.95
BSTch 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.95
IF
UNB(PC1) 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.74 0.66 0.70
UNB(PC4) 0.49 0.51 0.62 0.65 0.81 0.79
CTU 0.94 0.93 0.81 0.88 0.83 0.85
MAWI 0.86 0.70 0.54 0.67 0.56 0.55
TV&PC 0.95 0.98 0.90 0.99 0.74 0.79
SFrig 0.96 0.96 0.56 0.94 0.93 0.93
BSTch 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.96
AE
UNB(PC1) 0.72 0.40 0.50 0.93 0.81 0.77
UNB(PC4) 0.70 0.52 0.64 0.84 0.83 0.86
CTU 0.91 0.96 0.85 0.96 0.83 0.87
MAWI 0.56 0.58 0.50 0.70 0.58 0.55
TV&PC 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.85 0.95
SFrig 0.95 0.85 0.72 0.92 0.96 0.96
BSTch 0.97 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.96
KDE
UNB(PC1) 0.34 0.58 0.68 0.92 0.74 0.76
UNB(PC4) 0.47 0.63 0.76 0.80 0.81 0.85
CTU 0.96 0.93 0.94 0.97 0.82 0.84
MAWI 0.88 0.48 0.57 0.43 0.60 0.57
TV&PC 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.99 0.88 0.93
SFrig 0.97 0.91 0.79 0.78 0.95 0.95
BSTch 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.95
Figure 2 presents the differences in AUC obtained using packet size information, minus those obtained on corresponding
representations without size information. We observe significant positive differences for most ML procedures on most
datasets—which correspond to a range of novelty detection problems, whether malicious attacks, or novel devices or
activity. Even in those cases when size information does not help, it nonetheless does not hurt, except in rare cases such
as MAWI under IAT when employing OCSVM and KDE. However, even in this case, we observe (see Table 3) that the
concatenation of IAT+SIZE yields worse AUC than IAT or SIZE alone. The exact reason is unclear and could be due to
overfitting, as the concatenation increases feature dimension in ways that might affect nonparametric models such as
OCSVM and KDE given the relatively modest training size of MAWI (800+ datapoints).
The most significant positive differences are observed for IF, AE, and PCA in the case of IAT, while no significant
differences are observed for sampling-based representations, such as SAMP-SIZE vs. SAMP-NUM. Interestingly,
for fixed datasets, trends are generally consistent across ML methods, suggesting that whether size information helps
depends most on devices’ characteristics, rather than the ML method employed or the type of detection problem.
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Figure 1: Difference in AUC for FFT vs. raw time series representations.
In general, the inclusion of packet sizes for novelty detection makes sense, as the packet size can provide some indication
about the nature of the underlying activity. For example, for the case of the UNB dataset, attack traffic may be unique in
size relative to other types of activities. In the case of the private IoT datasets, novel activities may be less likely to
produce individual packets of differing sizes unless the activities themselves are new.
5.3 Effect of Packet Header
We now consider the effects of information in packet headers on novelty detection, focusing on the information available
in various TCP flags. We focus on the following eight flags in each packet: FIN, SYN, RST, PSH, ACK, URG, ECE,
and CWR, and TTL. We do not include IP address or port information in this part of our analysis. Given the already
established benefits (or at least invariance in AUC) of including packet size information, we now take representations
such as STATS, IAT+SIZE and SAMP-SIZE as baselines to which we concatenate packet header information (for each
packet in a flow) and record differences in performance.
In general, we observe no significant degradation in performance in adding header information, and in fact, observe
improvements for some datasets such as SFrig under OCSVM and KDE (novel activity detection) where we might not
necessarily expect such header information to help. The simple explanation is that in fact, even for problems such as
activity detection, a device might switch destination IP or ports depending on the type of activity being performed.
Figure 3 presents the differences in AUC obtained with packet header information minus that obtained without header
information. The same trends are observed across ML approaches. As might be expected, we observe the most
significant improvements on those datasets corresponding to (1) detecting malicious activity (UNB)—where infected
traffic might be rerouted to new destinations, thereby resulting in traffic with different distributions of packet TTL
values corresponding to the different, new destinations—or (2) detecting novel devices (CTU, MAWI)—where header
information such as certain TCP options can a device or operating system pertinent to a device.
Although TV & PC seem to be an exception to (2), the general lack of improvement is simply due to the fact that AUC’s
for the baseline representations were already near perfect (close to 1) across ML approaches (see Table 3). This happens
to also be the case (i.e., near perfect AUC’s) for those baseline representations where we observe little difference in
AUC for the two detection problems (1) and (2). The most improvement across ML methods is observed for MAWI
where the baseline representations yielded poor AUC’s to start with (Table 3).
Figure 4 shows that certain packet header fields can be particularly useful for novelty detection, depending on the
anomaly; these results are evident in the results. One of the more important findings from taking a closer look at the
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Figure 2: Differences in AUC due to including vs. excluding packet size information.
correlations between features and ground truth is that the most important packet header values will depend on the
novelty detection problem. We explore this in more detail below.
Attack detection. In the case of the UNB dataset, we see that the SYN flag can be very useful in identifying novelty
events related to security, as the SYN flag correspond to a TCP handshake that occurs at the beginning of the connection
and is commonly related to certain types of denial of service attacks, such as a SYN flood. Other packet header
information that exhibits correlation include other flags that are commonly associated with denial of service attacks,
including the RST and FIN flags, which victim hosts may send in response to a SYN. In all of these cases, an increase in
packets that include these flags could likely correspond with a volumetric denial of service attack, such as a SYN flood.
Novel device detection. The MAWI dataset, where the novelty detection problem involves detecting a novel device,
finds the TTL field in a packet header to be significant. This also follows intuition, as the TTL value is a coarse
indicator of network topology (i.e., how many network-level “hops” a device is from a particular destination endpoint)
and naturally two different devices on the network may be located at different network attachment points and thus be
different distances away from common network locations. Such topological differences would be apparent in the TTL
field, and a new device attaching at a different location on the network could appear as a sudden influx of network
traffic that bears a different distribution in TTL values. In particular, sudden deviations in distributions of TTL values in
the dataset may thus reflect the injection of traffic from new devices, or possibly attackers. On the other hand, we see
in this dataset that the SYN and TTL fields are less useful for novelty detection concerning activities (e.g., the SFrig
dataset, which involves detection of activities in the dataset).
Novel activity detection. If someone begins to interact with a connected IoT device in new ways—triggering new
types of activities—the traffic itself may bear differences from previously seen traffic. Differences in the traffic itself
may arise because activities themselves may bear unique signatures in the underlying network traffic. For example,
the amount and nature of traffic generated by opening and closing a refrigerator door in SFrig will generate different
types of traffic than the kind of traffic that is generated by activities that do not involve human interaction (e.g., a
software update). These fundamental differences may appear in different ways, such as differences in traffic volume
or timing, and in some cases they may appear in the TCP header flags themselves. In the case of SFrig, we see that
the ACK flag has a high correlation with ground truth, indicating that changes in the prevalence of ACKs (i.e., packet
acknowledgments) may represent changes in underlying activities. This characteristic likely results from the underlying
behavior of TCP, the Internet’s transport protocol, and how it handles packet acknowledgments for flows of different
sizes and timings. For example, for large traffic flows, TCP will sometimes optimize its acknowledgment behavior,
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Figure 3: Differences in AUC due to including vs. excluding packet header information.
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Figure 4: Top 6 correlation between each value in packet headers and ground truth (y).
using techniques such as delayed ACK to improve network performance. Highly interactive behavior and the traffic it
generates may exhibit very different qualities than automated traffic (e.g., a software update involving the transfer of
a large amount of data) and thus different behavior in ACK traffic. The distribution of ACK fields in the traffic may
reflect higher traffic volumes during periods of novel activity.
6 Conclusion
Novelty detection problems in computer networking require making important decisions about how to represent traffic
data. Traffic data are captured as “raw” packet captures, where each packet has an individual timestamp, thus taking the
format of an irregularly sampled timeseries. The data itself must be subsequently transformed into a representation for
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model input; often, the representation of the input data can be as important for model accuracy as the choice of the
model or model parameters.
This paper takes a first step towards exploring the effects of network traffic representation for novelty detection, focusing
on a range of novel behaviors in the Internet of Things (IoT)—security events, novel devices, and novel human behaviors
and interactions. We use a collection of datasets to evaluate different traffic representations across a range of models.
Our work reveals several important findings: (1) popular Fourier domain representations do not significantly improve
accuracy over simple time-domain representations; (2) representations that include traffic sizes and packet header fields
(e.g., IP TTL, TCP flags) can significantly improve model accuracy as measured by area under the curve (AUC).
This study has important implications for the design of future measurement and analysis systems that use network traffic
data for novelty detection, in the IoT and more generally for deployed network systems. From a systems perspective,
capturing full packet traces can introduce significant costs, yet aggressive aggregation can preclude certain data
representations that are important for model accuracy. In particular, we find that raw packet traces can be summarized
in terms of flow-level statistics in short time windows or inter-arrival times, and augmented with sequences of packet
sizes and flags; augmentation of simple timeseries representations with this metadata significantly improves accuracy.
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A Information on Datasets
Table 4: Data representation dimensions for each dataset.
Device IAT-FFT
IAT,
SIZE-FFT
SIZE,
STATS
SAMP-SIZE
SAMP-NUM-FFT,
SAMP-NUM,
PC1 14 15 10 14
PC2 16 17 10 16
PC3 15 16 10 15
PC4 17 18 10 17
PC5 17 18 10 17
2Rsps 8 9 10 8
2PCs 25 26 10 25
TV&PC 12 13 10 12
GHom 19 20 10 19
SCam 6 7 10 6
SFrig 30 31 10 30
BSTch 148 149 10 148
Table 5: Train and Test sample set sizes.
Reference Devices Train set size Test set sizes
UNB IDS
PC1 Normal: 10000 Normal: 179, Attack: 179
PC2 Normal: 10000 Normal: 257, Attack: 257
PC3 Normal: 10000 Normal: 221, Attack: 221
PC4 Normal: 10000 Normal: 209, Attack: 209
PC5 Normal: 10000 Normal: 360, Attack: 360
CTU IoT 2Rsps Normal: 3991 Normal: 400, Novel device: 400
MAWI 2PCs Normal: 824 Normal: 400, Novel device: 400
Private IoT
TV&PC Normal: 4636 Normal: 346, Novel device: 346
GHom Normal: 7376 Normal: 513, Novel activity: 513
SCam Normal: 10000 Normal: 197, Novel activity: 197
SFrig Normal: 2952 Normal: 296, Novel activity: 296
BSTch Normal: 997 Normal: 236, Novel activity: 236
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B Evaluation with Best Parameters
Table 6: AUCs for 4 ML approaches on basic feature representations with best parameters.
Detector Dataset STATS SIZE IAT SIZE
IAT+
NUM
SAMP-
SIZE
SAMP-
OCSVM
UNB(PC2) 0.64 0.75 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.85
UNB(PC3) 0.59 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.83 0.85
UNB(PC5) 0.47 0.73 0.84 0.86 0.76 0.81
GHom 0.76 0.97 0.70 0.70 0.95 0.96
SCam 0.58 0.61 0.56 0.62 0.56 0.61
IF
UNB(PC2) 0.68 0.61 0.68 0.75 0.81 0.80
UNB(PC3) 0.62 0.63 0.70 0.79 0.81 0.80
UNB(PC5) 0.55 0.61 0.69 0.74 0.79 0.74
GHom 0.88 0.77 0.44 0.54 0.96 0.96
SCam 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.60 0.56
AE
UNB(PC2) 0.78 0.66 0.71 0.83 0.83 0.77
UNB(PC3) 0.76 0.58 0.71 0.90 0.85 0.80
UNB(PC5) 0.82 0.66 0.73 0.87 0.88 0.87
GHom 0.84 0.69 0.35 0.86 0.97 0.96
SCam 0.63 0.61 0.57 0.65 0.61 0.60
KDE
UNB(PC2) 0.61 0.73 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.80
UNB(PC3) 0.53 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.82 0.85
UNB(PC5) 0.53 0.69 0.84 0.86 0.75 0.82
GHom 0.60 0.97 0.71 0.72 0.96 0.96
SCam 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.63 0.54 0.60
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Table 7: AUCs for GMM and PCA on basic feature representations with best parameters.
Detector Dataset STATS SIZE IAT SIZE
IAT+
NUM
SAMP-
SIZE
SAMP-
GMM
UNB(PC1) 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.75 0.84 0.74
UNB(PC2) 0.84 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.83 0.84
UNB(PC3) 0.87 0.78 0.75 0.91 0.83 0.81
UNB(PC4) 0.68 0.59 0.61 0.65 0.89 0.86
UNB(PC5) 0.60 0.64 0.72 0.79 0.85 0.76
CTU 0.98 0.96 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.88
MAWI 0.80 0.63 0.53 0.59 0.62 0.69
TV&PC 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99
GHom 0.96 0.93 0.90 0.93 0.97 0.96
SCam 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.65
SFrig 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.95
BSTch 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.97
PCA
UNB(PC1) 0.74 0.41 0.35 0.93 0.86 0.85
UNB(PC2) 0.86 0.67 0.71 0.82 0.85 0.81
UNB(PC3) 0.75 0.56 0.70 0.88 0.83 0.82
UNB(PC4) 0.72 0.52 0.65 0.82 0.89 0.88
UNB(PC5) 0.79 0.64 0.73 0.87 0.91 0.89
CTU 0.95 0.95 0.84 0.97 0.84 0.87
MAWI 0.66 0.71 0.49 0.74 0.59 0.54
TV&PC 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.94 0.94
GHom 0.85 0.71 0.34 0.97 0.97 0.96
SCam 0.63 0.61 0.57 0.65 0.62 0.59
SFrig 0.97 0.95 0.79 0.97 0.96 0.96
BSTch 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.97
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B.1 Effect of Fourier Domain Representation
The figures below show the difference in AUC for the FFT vs. raw timeseries representations with the best model
parameters for each model. FFT transformations have little effect on model accuracy.
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Figure 5: Difference in AUC for FFT vs. raw time series representations with best parameters.
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Figure 6: Difference in AUC for FFT vs. raw time series representations generated by GMM and PCA with best parameters.
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B.2 Effect of Packet Size Information
The figures below show the difference in AUC for including vs. excluding packet size information for different models:
IAT and SAMP. Including packet size can significantly improve model accuracy in certain cases.
UN
B(P
C2)
UN
B(P
C3)
UN
B(P
C5) GH
om
SC
am
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
A
U
C
 d
iff
er
en
ce
OCSVM
UN
B(P
C2)
UN
B(P
C3)
UN
B(P
C5) GH
om
SC
am
IF
UN
B(P
C2)
UN
B(P
C3)
UN
B(P
C5) GH
om
SC
am
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
A
U
C
 d
iff
er
en
ce
AE
UN
B(P
C2)
UN
B(P
C3)
UN
B(P
C5) GH
om
SC
am
KDE
IAT+SIZE \ IAT SAMP-SIZE \ SAMP-NUM
Figure 7: Differences in AUC due to including vs. excluding packet size information with best parameters.
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Figure 8: Differences in AUC due to including vs. excluding packet size information generated by GMM and PCA with best
parameters.
19
B.3 Effect of Packet Header
The figures below show the difference in AUC for including vs. excluding packet header information (i.e., IP TTL,
TCP flags) for different models: STATS, IAT, and SAMP. Including packet header information almost always improves
model accuracy for these models.
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Figure 9: Differences in AUC due to including vs. excluding packet header information with best parameters.
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Figure 10: Differences in AUC due to including vs. excluding packet header information generated by GMM and PCA with
best parameters.
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C Evaluation with Default Parameters
Table 8: AUCs for 4 ML approaches on basic feature representations with default parameters.
Detector Dataset STATS SIZE IAT IZE
IAT+S
NUM
SAMP-
SIZE
SAMP-
OCSVM
UNB(PC1) 0.56 0.20 0.40 0.89 0.66 0.74
UNB(PC2) 0.43 0.66 0.82 0.74 0.79 0.85
UNB(PC3) 0.30 0.83 0.82 0.85 0.82 0.85
UNB(PC4) 0.42 0.58 0.82 0.76 0.67 0.78
UNB(PC5) 0.41 0.64 0.84 0.82 0.75 0.74
CTU 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.88 0.88
MAWI 0.43 0.38 0.56 0.38 0.58 0.59
TV&PC 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.98 0.70 0.86
GHom 0.73 0.97 0.10 0.11 0.95 0.94
SCam 0.58 0.51 0.54 0.61 0.59 0.58
SFrig 0.91 0.90 0.77 0.84 0.94 0.95
BSTch 0.96 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.92 0.92
IF
UNB(PC1) 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.69 0.65 0.65
UNB(PC2) 0.65 0.61 0.68 0.74 0.80 0.75
UNB(PC3) 0.61 0.62 0.70 0.73 0.80 0.72
UNB(PC4) 0.45 0.46 0.61 0.61 0.81 0.70
UNB(PC5) 0.47 0.59 0.69 0.70 0.78 0.72
CTU 0.94 0.92 0.78 0.88 0.83 0.84
MAWI 0.86 0.68 0.53 0.66 0.56 0.55
TV&PC 0.95 0.98 0.89 0.99 0.73 0.78
GHom 0.86 0.68 0.44 0.47 0.96 0.96
SCam 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.56
SFrig 0.96 0.95 0.54 0.94 0.93 0.93
BSTch 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.96 0.96
AE
UNB(PC1) 0.66 0.39 0.33 0.75 0.78 0.75
UNB(PC2) 0.74 0.54 0.56 0.81 0.78 0.76
UNB(PC3) 0.65 0.56 0.71 0.81 0.83 0.78
UNB(PC4) 0.60 0.39 0.63 0.74 0.85 0.86
UNB(PC5) 0.79 0.25 0.37 0.79 0.84 0.85
CTU 0.91 0.95 0.80 0.96 0.80 0.76
MAWI 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.60 0.57 0.54
TV&PC 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.99 0.77 0.88
GHom 0.77 0.62 0.33 0.70 0.96 0.95
SCam 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.61 0.59 0.55
SFrig 0.92 0.78 0.71 0.91 0.96 0.96
BSTch 0.95 0.87 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.95
KDE
UNB(PC1) 0.28 0.37 0.51 0.92 0.74 0.75
UNB(PC2) 0.59 0.63 0.82 0.74 0.77 0.80
UNB(PC3) 0.52 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.84
UNB(PC4) 0.37 0.51 0.71 0.77 0.81 0.84
UNB(PC5) 0.33 0.62 0.84 0.84 0.74 0.81
CTU 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.97 0.82 0.84
MAWI 0.66 0.38 0.56 0.41 0.57 0.56
TV&PC 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.98 0.66 0.83
GHom 0.55 0.94 0.05 0.46 0.96 0.95
SCam 0.49 0.51 0.55 0.60 0.56 0.57
SFrig 0.94 0.91 0.73 0.77 0.94 0.94
BSTch 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.92 0.91
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Table 9: AUCs for 2 additional ML approaches (GMM and PCA) on basic feature representations with default parameters.
Detector Dataset STATS SIZE IAT IZE
IAT+S
NUM
SAMP-
SIZE
SAMP-
GMM
UNB(PC1) 0.37 0.23 0.16 0.81 0.76 0.73
UNB(PC2) 0.56 0.52 0.65 0.71 0.85 0.54
UNB(PC3) 0.52 0.61 0.75 0.90 0.81 0.56
UNB(PC4) 0.40 0.47 0.60 0.57 0.81 0.82
UNB(PC5) 0.36 0.43 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.73
CTU 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.84 0.88 0.84
MAWI 0.65 0.37 0.52 0.40 0.60 0.58
TV&PC 1.00 0.88 0.86 0.57 0.60 0.80
GHom 0.33 0.30 0.06 0.39 0.96 0.96
SCam 0.47 0.46 0.52 0.60 0.54 0.59
SFrig 0.73 0.91 0.82 0.93 0.96 0.95
BSTch 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.99 0.93 0.90
PCA
UNB(PC1) 0.66 0.29 0.27 0.65 0.72 0.85
UNB(PC2) 0.59 0.67 0.43 0.32 0.84 0.77
UNB(PC3) 0.71 0.48 0.70 0.48 0.73 0.68
UNB(PC4) 0.65 0.22 0.64 0.63 0.89 0.69
UNB(PC5) 0.73 0.29 0.44 0.78 0.66 0.67
CTU 0.95 0.94 0.80 0.97 0.77 0.79
MAWI 0.65 0.71 0.46 0.54 0.59 0.51
TV&PC 0.98 0.97 0.40 0.99 0.94 0.94
GHom 0.20 0.71 0.30 0.97 0.96 0.95
SCam 0.55 0.61 0.49 0.64 0.62 0.58
SFrig 0.96 0.90 0.76 0.97 0.96 0.95
BSTch 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.96
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C.1 Effect of Fourier Domain Representation
The figures below show differences in model accuracy for Fourier domain representation vs. raw timeseries rep-
resentations for different models and datasets. Fourier domain representations in general do not improve model
accuracy.
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Figure 11: Difference in AUC for FFT vs. raw time series representations with default parameters.
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Figure 12: Difference in AUC for FFT vs. raw time series representations generated by GMM and PCA with default parameters.
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C.2 Effect of Packet Size Information
The figures below show differences in model accuracy as a result of including packet size information for different
models and datasets. Packet size information generally improves model accuracy.
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Figure 13: Differences in AUC due to including vs. excluding packet size information with default parameters.
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Figure 14: Differences in AUC due to including vs. excluding packet size information generated by GMM and PCA with default
parameters.
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C.3 Effect of Packet Header
The figures below show differences in model accuracy as a result of including packet header information for different
models and datasets. Packet header information generally improves model accuracy.
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Figure 15: Differences in AUC due to including vs. excluding packet header information with default parameters.
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Figure 16: Differences in AUC due to including vs. excluding packet header information generated by GMM and PCA with
default parameters.
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